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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is an empirical test of the role and effects of trust next
to other components of governance, in buyer-supplier relations that carry risks of
dependence due to specific investments. Several dimensions of trust are ident-
ified, and measures for them are designed. They are implemented on a survey of
ten customer relations for each of ten suppliers of components to OEM’s of
electrical/electronic devices. An econometric test is conducted of the effect of the
trust related variables on perceived risk for the supplier in the relationship, next
to the effects one would expect of specific investments as causes of risk, and
forms of governance used to reduce risk. Perceived risk is measured in two
dimensions: the probability that problems will arise, and the size of loss that
would arise if those problems materialize. Control is exercised for firm related
effects: uncertainty avoidance (which may be an autonomous cause of percep-
tions regarding risk) and firm size (large firms may have a better diversification
of risks). Hypotheses concerning the effects are well corroborated.
This report is a product of a research project sponsored by the Economics Research Foundation (ESR), which
is part of the Netherlands’ Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
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Introduction
Several causes are yielding radical product differentiation, in many markets.
Technological development yields flexible methods of production and acts as an
enabling cause1. Individualization of consumer behaviour provides a market
opportunity. Globalization of markets provides an incentive, to reduce pressures
of price competition by product differentiation. But radical product differenti-
ation greatly increases the complexity of both input and output markets, and to
be "sustainable" (Zuscovitch, 1994), it requires that firms concentrate on core
competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), and outsource as many activities as
possible, even if that entails "transaction specific investments", in the sense
treated in transaction cost economics (TCE).
As indicated in TCE, transaction specific investments yield dependencies
and risks of "hold-up". This raises complicated issues of "governance" of
relations between formally independent but materially dependent firms, in forms
of organization "between market and hierarchy" (Williamson, 1985). Traditional
TCE, as developed by Williamson, focuses on the role of self-interest, opportun-
ism and contractual instruments of governance, and neglects the role of trust,
even in later work (Williamson, 1991). In other research traditions, notably the
work of the IMP (Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group), trust is a central
variable (Hakansson, 1982, 1987, 1989; Johanson & Mattson, 1987). But in that
perspective, trust appears to be pervasive to the point of neglecting the role of
self-interest and opportunism. Our perspective is that trust as well as its limits
due to opportunism play a role, and that trust is a dimension of governance next
to those derived from TCE: mutual self-interest and dependence, legal ordering,
private ordering by guarantees, shared ownership of specific assets, hostages,
reputation effects, and the like, as safeguards against risk involved in specific
investments (Nooteboom, 1993b).
According to social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), in addition to an
1 In particular information technology: programmable machines, computer aided
design, simulating rather than building prototypes, etc.
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economic dimension (extrinsic utility), exchange often has a social dimension
(intrinsic utility). Economists tend to think of value in exchange as something
that exists independently from the transaction. As formulated by Murakami &
Rohlen (1992, 70): "The value of the relationship itself is typically ignored and
the impersonality of the transaction is assumed". In intrinsic utility, the exchange
process itself matters, in addition to the economic surplus and its division that
the exchange yields. People may prefer to transact on the basis of trust and its
concomitants of ethics, kinship, friendship or empathy. Social exchange relies
more on unspecified, implicit obligations2, which depend on shared systems of
meaning, belief and ethics.
The economic relevance of trust is that it economizes on the specifica-
tion and monitoring of contracts and material incentives for cooperation. This
makes transactions not only cheaper, and on the basis of social exchange theory
perhaps more agreeable, but also makes for greater flexibility. With detailed
formal contracts it is more difficult (slow and costly) to modify terms for
changed conditions. Apart from its own worth, trust pays. But it also carries a
risk of the betrayal of trust.
For a definition of trust and the specification of a framework for its role
in governance, we adopt the analysis from Nooteboom (1995).
Trust
Trust may concern a partner’s ability to perform according to the intentions and
expectations of a relation (competence trust), or his intentions not to defect
willingly (behavioral trust). Here, we focus on the latter type of trust. Of course,
risks due to failures of competence are important in subcontracting relations, but
they do no form the focus here. The focus is on the relation between behavioral
trust and cooperation.
According to Williams (1988), cooperation requires willingness to accept
2 The idea that exchange includes non-contractual elements of course goes back (at
least) to Durkheim (1893).
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dependence, which requires assurance that other, non dependent (or less depend-
ent) parties will not defect in the cooperation. According to Dasgupta (1988),
trust is associated with expectations regarding the other’s choice of actions that
have a bearing on one’s own choice of action. Such expectations may have a
strong or a weak basis, ranging from assurance from objective facts and logical
reason, through belief which is less firmly based on experience and argument, to
unsubstantiated faith. Gambetta (1988b: 217) summarized different views on
trust as the subjective probability that one assigns to action by another agent (or
group of agents) which affects one’s own action.
Since our focus is on relations between organizations, the question arises
what the relation is between the conduct of individuals and firms: the "micro-
micro" problem. As argued by Ring & Van de Ven (1994), they are related by
roles that individuals are assigned in organizations. Conduct "qua persona" is
restricted and guided by organizational roles. Alignment between the two can be
a problem. If cooperation is founded on trust based on personal bonding,
problems may arise concerning the exigencies of organizational role. Personal
loyalty may deviate from organizational interest, and may even lead to corrup-
tion or embezzlement. Too strong personal ties may need to be prevented by
turnover of personnel across roles. Conversely, personnel change may lead to a
breakdown of relations based on personal trust. Such considerations should be
part of governance.
Our approach to the micro-micro problem now is as follows. First of all,
if trust is indeed interpreted as a subjective probability assigned to conduct, it
can logically apply to a subjective probability held by an individual with respect
to the conduct of an organization in terms of decisions taken by that organiz-
ation. Of course, this subjective probability may at least in part be based on
experiences and perceptions of individuals in their organizational roles, and
corresponding organizational constraints, at the partner organization. Thus we
will handle trust in terms of relational risk with respect to the partner organiz-
ation, as perceived by an individual who plays a central role in the focal
organization (notably a CEO):
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proposition 1
It makes sense to treat trust as a perception of an individual with respect
to a partner organization
The argument implies that trust is not an objective condition, and varies between
individuals, even in otherwise identical conditions.
Dimensions of trust
Williams (1988) proposed a scheme for the determinants of cooperation, as
reproduced in figure 1. Williams argued that none of these sources suffices by
itself, and that in cooperation some mix will always be operative, while no
universally best mix, regardless of specific conditions, can be specified. Often,
trust will not suffice as a basis for cooperation. Conversely, material self-interest
and coercion are seldom sufficient as a basis for cooperation: one needs trust to
the extent that one cannot fully control the partner’s conduct by threat and
reward (cf. Deutsch, 1962, quoted in Zand, 1972).
figure 1: sources of cooperation
macro micro
egotistic coercion or fear of material advantage
sanctions from some or "interest"
authority (god, law)
non-egotistic ethics: values/norms bonds of friendship,
of proper conduct kinship or empathy
If trust is associated with a subjective probability that a partner will not
make misuse of one’s dependence, without further qualification, then anything
that contributes to such subjective probability would belong to trust. However,
trust is generally not associated with motives of self interest. We trust someone
if he is likely to cooperate even if he is not coerced to do so and has no direct
material interest in doing so. This yields:
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proposition 2
Trust represents a source of cooperation next to sources that pertain to
self-interest and coercion
Thus, from figure 1, trust is associated with the non-egotistic sources of cooper-
ation; with loyalty to a partner due to ethics or bonds of friendship or kinship
rather than coercion or material self-interest. From this we derive:
proposition 3
One dimension of trust is institutionalization, in the form of values and
norms that constitute an ethics of transactional relationships
It would not be justified to say that the recognition of such institutions is absent
from traditional TCE. For example, Williamson (1991) recognizes the effect of
institutions on transaction costs, but under the assumption that they apply equally
to all actors in a given context or national culture, they do not serve to distin-
guish between "structural alternatives" of governance structure within that
context. Here, we propose that they do, for two reasons. F i r s t , t h e
susceptibility to values and norms is likely to differ between individuals within a
national culture, and between organizations, as part of organizational culture, so
that their impact may vary within national boundaries (cf. Noorderhaven, 1995).
Second, institutions may not be exogenous to a transaction relationship, and may
partly develop within it.
The second dimension of trust, in the form of bonds of friendship or
kinship, is related to the concept of social exchange, indicated before. Social
exchange by its nature is restricted to insiders: people with whom one shares the
bonds that form a basis for trust. Trust requires familiarity and mutual understan-
ding, and hence depends on time and context; on habit formation and a positive
development of a relation. As indicated by Hirschman (1984): unlike most
economic commodities, trust may grow rather than wear out by usage. If trust is
associated with a subjective probability that a partner will cooperate, then a zero
probability means blind distrust. The problem with that is that because it
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prevents us from entering upon cooperation, we miss the opportunity to build
trust on the basis of successful cooperation, and zero trust remains zero (cf.
Gambetta, 1988b). On the other hand, if on the basis of a non-zero subjective
probability of cooperation by the partner one enters cooperation, the probability
will be adjusted on the basis of experience. It may grow, but that is not necess-
arily the case: naivety may be tuned down to realism. If trust is blind, in the
form of a unit subjective probability, it is likely to be disappointed sooner or
later, because few partners will be able to resist every "golden opportunity" for
defection. But positive experiences with a relation, and an expansion of its scope
will enhance a favourable perception of probability of cooperation. From this we
derive:
proposition 4
A second dimension of trust is associated with what we will call "hab-
itualization": familiarization, habit formation, and bonding, associated
with positive experiences.
Hypotheses on trust and governance
We proposed that trust is one source of cooperation, next to coercion and self-
interest. The latter two have been elaborated in an exploration of forms of
"governance" in TCE. To embed trust in a wider scheme of governance, Noot-
eboom (1995) proceeds as follows:
X is willing to engage in cooperation with Y (i.e. enter upon cooperation
or continue it), even if this makes X dependent, if X has a more or less
well grounded belief, in the form of a subjective probability, that Y will
cooperate in the sense of not mis-using such dependence. This belief may
be based on (perceived) available opportunities for misuse on the part of
Y, Y’s incentives towards misuse, and Y’s propensity to employ the
opportunities. Inclination to use opportunities for defection is related to
trust, which has its basis in ethics, kinship, friendship or empathy.
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My definition of (behavioral) trust would now be as follows:
X trusts Y to the extent that X chooses to cooperate with Y on the basis
of a subjective probability that Y will choose not to employ opportunities
for defection that X considers damaging, even if it is in the interest of Y
to do so. The trustworthiness of Y depends on Y’s true propensity to
employ those opportunities
figure 2: determinants of risk of opportunism
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This is elaborated into the scheme in figure 2 for the risk of opportunism of ego
in his relation with alterHere risk of opportunism is identified as the net outcome
of causes of dependence, legal and private governance and trust. This risk has
two dimensions: the probability that the partner (alter) will behave opportunisti-
cally, and the loss one incurs if he does.
In an earlier study (Berger, Noorderhaven & Nooteboom, 1995), we
investigated the determinants of only one side of risk: the size of a possible loss.
Here we want to investigate the explanation of both sides of risk simultaneously.
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The scheme represents the perspective of one agent (ego; in our present
study: the supplier). A similar scheme applies to the other partner (alter). In our
present study we focus on risk and its determinants as perceived by the supplier,
in the customer relation considered.
In the scheme we find the role of trust, as discussed, in the (perceived)
propensity of an agent to employ opportunities for opportunism. In opportunities
for opportunism we recognize the notion of legal ordering from TCE: contractual
limitations of the room for opportunistic action. Private ordering also may yield
restrictions on such opportunities: losses incurred from the provision of hostages
or other guarantees. In the switching costs we recognize elements of governance
from TCE such as loss of (one’s share in) transaction specific investments, loss
of quality of supply due to discontinuity of the relation. For our present
purpose, we derive the following hypotheses for empirical testing, in which we
separate the effects on size and probability of loss.
hypothesis 1
Value of the partner (VA) has a positive effect on the size of possible
loss (rather than any effect on its probability)
hypothesis 2
Switching costs, measured by means of asset specificity (ASE), have a
positive effect on the size of possible loss (rather than any effect on its
probability)
The greatest part of switching costs, in line with TCE, consists of dedicated
assets and transaction specific investments that the supplier has made.
hypothesis 3
Ordering (private and legal), taken as a restriction of opportunities for
the partners opportunism (ROA) has a negative effect on the probability
of loss (rather than any effect on its size)
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This hypothesis can be broken down into the two types of ordering:
hypothesis 3a
Legal ordering (LO) has a negative effect on the probability of loss
hypothesis 3b
Private ordering (PO) has a negative effect on the probability of loss
hypothesis 4
Trust, with its dimensions of habitualization and institutionalization (HI)
has a negative effect on the probability of loss (rather than on its size)
The last hypothesis can be broken down into the various dimensions of trust, as
discussed before:
hypothesis 4a
Institutionalization (INST) has a negative effect on the probability of loss
hypothesis 4b
Habitualization (HAB) has a negative effect on the probability of loss
Also, there may be a psychological side to trust, in the sense that it is mitigated
by self-confidence: a supplier who is confident of his own value will be more
trusting than one that is diffident (cf. Deutsch, 1973). An effect of own value
may also be interpreted differently. According to figure 2, the partner (Y) has
less incentive towards opportunism to the extent that he is himself dependent on
X, since then X might retaliate with opportunism. If X is confident about his
value to Y, he may rationally expect Y to have less incentive towards opportun-
ism:
hypothesis 5
Own value (VE) has a negative effect on probability of loss (rather than
its size).
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The literature on repeated games (Axelrod, 1984) demonstrates how the expec-
tation of future cooperation constrains opportunism: short term benefits from
opportunistic defection may be less than long term gains of ongoing cooperation.
The implication is that a perspective for ongoing, future cooperation has effects
on both the value of the partner, and hence on the size of loss, and on the
probability of loss:
hypothesis 6
Continuity of the relation (CON), based on past growth (GR) and future
perspective (FP) has a positive effect on size of loss, and a negative one
on probability of loss.
This can also be broken down into its components
hypothesis 6a
Past growth (GR) has a positive effect on size and a negative effect on
probability of loss
hypothesis 6b
Future perspective (FP) has a positive effect on size and a negative
effect on probability of loss
These hypotheses do not pertain to trust, as defined before, in that they are part
of the egotistic sources of cooperation: they pertain to the rational evaluation of
self-interest by the partner. They do not impact, like trust, on the inclination
towards opportunism, given the opportunities and incentives for it, but on the
incentives, inspired by self-interest.
We may proceed further along this line: ego may have other knowledge of
alter’s dependence, which may constrain his perceived incentives towards
opportunism, as illustrated in figure 2.
hypothesis 7
Other factors that indicate the dependence of alter, and thereby constrain
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his inclination towards opportunism (RSA), have a negative effect on
probability of loss (rather than its size)
Controls
In view of the structure of our data (ten customer relations for each of ten
suppliers), we should expect firm-specific effects. To what extent are perceptions
of relational risk determined by characteristics of the perceiver rather than those
of the transaction relation? Indeed, the experiment was designed like this to
investigate such effects, next to the effects discussed above.
First of all, some people (and some firms) may be more sensitive to
risks (exhibit high "uncertainty avoidance") than others, so that ceteris paribus
they will perceive higher risks; in particular higher probability of loss:
hypothesis 8
High uncertainty avoidance (UAE) has a positive effect on the perceived
probability of loss (rather than on size of loss)
A larger firm is likely to be subject to lower transaction costs and relational risk,
compared to small firms, due to less bounded rationality and more capacity for
search, contract design, monitoring, and litigation, with the support of specialized
staff functions, and a wider spread across different products, markets and
transaction relations, yielding better opportunities for alternative employment of
partially specific assets, lower switching costs and a greater spread of risk (Noot-
eboom, 1993b). As a result it is likely to incur lower risks; in particular a
smaller size of loss:
hypothesis 9
Firm size (SE) has a negative effect on the size of loss (rather than on
its probability)
However, we cannot be sure that firm characteristics such as uncertainty avoid-
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ance and size suffice to account for all firm-specific effects, and firm dummies
will be added to test for remaining effects.
Data and measurement
A major question of course is how trust is to be measured. Here we take the
approach of constructing measures, by factor-analytic means, from multiple
questionnaire items relating to the different dimensions of trust, as discussed
before, in a survey of buyer-seller relations.
One part of our analysis is that opportunism and trust are to some extent
idiosyncratic: they vary between people and organizations even other conditions
are identical. As a result, trust and the choice of governance, and their effects on
perceived risk, will vary between people. We want to include this in our study
and therefore designed a survey with ten different suppliers in the same industry,
with for each of them ten customer relations. This allows us to test for system-
atic effects of trust, governance, etc. versus firm specific effects. A second
reason for this design was to distinguish the study from a previous one (Berger,
Noorderhaven & Nooteboom, 1995), on the basis of a survey of 80 suppliers to
a single OEM of photocopying machines.
The questionnaire used in the present study was based on that developed
in the previous one, with omission of items that had proved to be of little value,
and adding some new items. In the present study, one of the researchers was
present while the respondent completed the questionnaire, to minimize the risk
of misunderstanding of questions. This method also had the advantage that there
were no missing data. Apart from variables that by their nature are binary
(yes/no) or cardinal (e.g. firm turnover size) all items on the questionnaire were
five point scales. They were chosen on the basis of their hypothesized relation to
latent variables that resulted from the theoretical analysis.
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Table 1: Summary of hypotheses
Hypothesized effects of variables on size and probability of loss
size of loss probability of
(SLE) loss (PLE)
H1 Value alter (VA) + 0
% share turnover (%S)
remaining value alter (RVA)





H3 Restriction opp. alter (ROA) 0 -
legal ordering
private ordering
H4 Trust (HI) 0 -
habitualization
institutionalization
H5 Value ego (VE) 0 -
H6 Continuity (CON) + -
growth
future perspective
H7 Restraint alter (RSA) 0 -
H8 Uncertainty avoidance (UAE) 0 +
H9 Firm size (SE) - 0
For most variables, multiple underlying items were used, but sometimes
only a single item. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the measure-
ment hypotheses. Cronbach’s alpha was used to determine overall construct
reliability, with the cut-off point at the usual value of 0.7. Factor loadings were
used to assess for each item whether it contributes significantly to the joint
factor, with the cut-off point at the usual value of 0.3. When an item had a
lower loading, it was dropped, and the analysis was repeated for the remaining
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items, until a reliable scale with reliable loadings emerged. The items were then
added to yield a measure of the latent variable. The resulting scales, with their
alpha values and specification of the underlying items, is given in an appendix.
As shown, all multi-item scales have an alpha above .7, except growth (.68).
Size of loss (SLE) is measured as a two-item scale, and probability of
loss as only a one-item scale. For value alter (VA) we have two measures:
percentage of sales to the focal customer (%S) and a scale of four further items
(RVA). Joining them into one scale greatly reduces the alpha value, and is
therefore rejected, so that both will be used separately.Asset specificity (ASE) is
measured as the aggregate of four constructs, one for each dimension of asset
specificity (as specified by Williamson), with a total of 10 items. Restraint of
opportunities of opportunism (ROA) is measured as the aggregate of two scales:
one for legal ordering (LO) and one for private ordering (PO), with a total of 7
items.
Trust (HI) is measured as an aggregate of two dimensions, called
habitualization (HAB) and institutionalization (INST), with a total of 6 items.
Value ego (VE) is an aggregate of 6 items. Continuity of the relation (CON) is
an aggregate of two scales, past growth of the relation (GR) and future perspec-
tive (FP), with a total of 5 items. Restraint alter (RSA) is composed of 5 items,
and uncertainty avoidance (UAE) of 7 items. Firm size naturally is a cardinal
measure.
The hypotheses are now summarized in table 1.
Tests
First, we test the idea that size of loss (SLE) and probability of loss (PLE)
constitute separate dimensions. In factor analytic terms: are they orthogonal? For
this we compare the factor analysis on the two items underlying SLE with a
factor analysis on the three items of SLE and PLE taken together. The results are
reported in table 2.
The table shows that Cronbachs alpha, which was quite high for the SLE
construct with its two items (sle1 and sle2), deteriorates drastically when we add
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the single item for PLE (from α = 0.90 to α = 0.26). A factor is then formed,
with high loadings from the items of SLE (0.95, 0.86), but a low loading (0.34)
from the item of PLE, with a correspondingly low communality (0.12) of that
item with the factor. The loading is only just above the cut-off point of 0.3. This
is sufficient evidence to conclude that our measurements of SLE and PLE indeed
represent separate dimensions, warranting separate regressions to explain each.
table 2: orthogonality SLE and PLE
construct Cronbach’s items factor communality
α loading
SLE 0.90 sle1 0.94 0.88
sle2 0.86 0.74
SLE + PLE 0.26 sle1 0.95 0.90
sle2 0.86 0.73
ple - 0.34 0.12
To test the hypotheses explaining size of loss and probability of loss, we
now regress SLE and PLE on the explanatory variables pertaining to:
captiveness ego: Value alter (%S and VA) and switching costs due to
dedicated and specific assets ego (ASE)
governance: Restriction of room for opportunism alter (ROA) due to
legal safeguards (LS) and private ordering (PO)
incentives alter: Value ego (VE), Continuity of the relation (CON), res-
traint alter (RSA)
trust: Habitualization and institutionalization (HI)
control variables: Uncertainty avoidance ego (UAE), Size ego (SE)
Later we will see what happens when we split up the explanatory variables into
their component variables, and we will test for any remaining firm effects. We
proceed by means of a backward procedure: all the explanatory variables are
included initially, and variables with non-significant effects (effects at a lower
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than 90% confidence level) are eliminated. The results are given in table 3.
From a confrontation between the results in table 3 and the hypotheses
in table 1, table 3 indicates which hypotheses are confirmed ( ), and which are
not ( ). Most of the hypotheses are confirmed. We will give a systematic
discussion later, where we will show that in some cases lack of confirmation
yields interesting interpretations.
Table 3: Summary of results: standardized regression coefficients
between brackets: significance level (T)
confirmed hypotheses are indicated with ;
lack of confirmation is indicated with
size of loss probability of
(SLE) loss (PLE)
H1 Value alter (VA)
% share turnover (%S) 0.59 0.02
(0.000)*** (0.78)
remaining value alter (RVA) 0.06 -0.05
(0.45) (0.60)
H2 Switching costs (ASE) 0.10 0.11
(0.31) (0.21)
H3 Restriction opp. alter (ROA) 0.10 -0.25
(0.20) (0.000)***
H4 Trust (HI) -0.06 -0.22
(0.43) (0.033)**
H5 Value ego (VE) -0.03 -0.05
(0.72) (0.58)
H6 Continuity (CON) 0.159 -0.249
(0.000)*** (0.019)**
H7 Restraint alter (RSA) 0.099 0.01
(0.018)** (0.91)
H8 Uncertainty avoidance (UAE) 0.07 -0.201
(0.32) (0.022)**
H9 Firm size (SE) 0.07 0.08
(0.39) (0.43)
adusted R square 0.52 0.32
* indicates a p-value for T between 0.1 and 0.05 (significance > 90%)
** indicates a p-value for T between 0.05 and 0.01
*** indicates a p-value for T smaller than 0.01 (significance > 99%)
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In the final step of the backward procedure, only those variables are
retained that have a significant effect (at least one *); the values and
significance levels of other variables derive from earlier steps.
Table 4: Results with RSA excluded
between brackets: significance level (T)
confirmed hypotheses are indicated with ;
lack of confirmation is indicated with
size of loss probability of
(SLE) loss (PLE)
H1 Value alter (VA)
% share turnover (%S) 0.52 0.02
(0.000)*** (0.78)
remaining value alter (RVA) 0.07 -0.05
(0.42) (0.60)
H2 Switching costs (ASE) 0.17 0.11
(0.031)** (0.21)
H3 Restriction opp. alter (ROA) 0.07 -0.34
(0.36) (0.000)***
H4 Trust (HI) -0.03 -0.22
(0.75) (0.033)**
H5 Value ego (VE) -0.03 -0.05
(0.72) (0.58)
H6 Continuity (CON) 0.306 -0.249
(0.000)*** (0.019)**
H7 Restraint alter (RSA) excluded excluded
H8 Uncertainty avoidance (UAE) 0.07 -0.201
(0.32) (0.022)**
H9 Firm size (SE) 0.07 0.08
(0.39) (0.43)
adjusted R square 0.52 0.32
The most striking lack of confirmation concerns the effect of RSA: restraints on
the incentive towards opportunism by alter. We had expected a zero effect on
SLE and a negative effect on PLE, but we find a zero effect on PLE and a
positive effect on SLE. However, inspection of the correlation matrix, supplied
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in appendix B, shows that RSA has a strong positive correlation with asset
specificity ASE, which suggests that RSA may be taking the place of ASE. The
correlation between ASE and RSA has an interesting implication: According to
hypothesis 1, asset specificity (ASE) increases the size of loss, but it also
contributes to the dependence of the partner, as indicated by the correlation
Table 5: Results with firm dummies
size of loss probability of
(SLE) loss (PLE)
H1 Value alter (VA)
% share turnover (%S) 0.53 excluded
(0.000)***
remaining value alter (RVA) excluded excluded
H2 Switching costs (ASE) 0.26 excluded
(0.007)***
H3 Restriction opp. alter (ROA) excluded -0.34
(0.000)***
H4 Trust (HI) excluded -0.26
(0.024)**
H5 Value ego (VE) excluded excluded
H6 Continuity (CON) 0.315 -0.295
(0.000)*** (0.011)**
H7 Restraint alter (RSA) excluded excluded
H8 Uncertainty avoidance (UAE) excluded -0.156
(0.089)**
H9 Firm size (SE) excluded excluded
Firm dummies D2 -0.15 D1 -0.12
(0.09)* (0.11)
D4 -0.13 D2 0.32
(0.05)* (0.000)***






adjusted R square 0.61 0.55
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between ASE and RSA, and thereby reduces his inclination towards opportun-
ism, which reduces the probability of loss. If we redo the regressions while
excluding RSA as a variable in the regressions for SLE, we obtain the result
summarized in table 4.For PLE the results are almost exactly as in table 3. For
SLE, ASE now has a significant effect: its coefficient hardly changes, but it is
now highly significant. Another result is that the coefficient of CON increases
(while maintaining its high level of significance).
We tried to investigate how effects of the variables may be distributed
over their component variables: for different types of asset specificity (ASE);
different types of ordering (LO and PO in ROA); different aspects of continuity
(GR and FP in CON); different dimensions of trust (HAB and INST in HI), in
order to test hypotheses 3a and 3b, 4a and 4b, 6a and 6b. But with the enlarged
number of explanatory variables we encountered strong multicollinearity.Next,
we tested for any remaining firm effects. Our hypothesis was that firm effects
are taken care of by the firm-related variables uncertainty avoidance (UAE) and
firm size (SE).
To test this, we repeated the regressions with dummies for the ten firms
(whose customer relations we are studying). To reduce the chance of
multicollinearity, we allowed only for the variables that were significant in the
last round (table 4). In other words: the object is to test whether, in comparison
with the last results, the addition of firm dummies:
1. yields a significant increase of R square
2. the results on the explanatory variables (table 4) are not disturbed
The results are given in table 5.
Table 5 shows that dummies do get significant effects, and that they
significantly raise R square. The must therefore reject our hypothesis that the
two firm specific explanatory variables (UAE and SE) suffice to account for firm
effects. The number of significant dummies is greater for SLE thanfor PLE. Note
that for PLE one of the firm specific variables (UAE) turned out to have a
significant effect, and thus covers at least part of firm vari
ation, while for SLE none of the two firm variables came out significant.
However, addition of the dummies did not effect the results concerning the
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systematic (non firm specific) effects in table 4. On the contrary: the size and
significance of those effects increased, with the exception of the effect of UAE
on PLE (which did, however, remain significant). Thus, in the present study the
omission of remaining firm effects (which are considerable) does not bias the
results on the systematic effects.
Finally, we further tested the stability of the results by taking step-wise
regression as an alternative to backward regression. It yielded virtually the same
results. The only difference worth mentioning concerns the inclusion of firm
dummies in the last round (table 5): fewer firm dummies were included in the
end result. In the regression of PLE the dummy for firm 1 was not included; in
the regression of SLE the dummies for firms 2 and 4 were not included. For the
rest, the pattern of significant and non-significant variables was identical, and
differences in regression coefficients and their significance levels were small.
Discussion
The study confirms the idea that relational risk has two dimensions: size of loss
and probability of loss, which have substantially different causes.
In particular, the central hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) is confirmed that
trust, induced by institutionalization and habitualization (HI), has a negative
effect on risk in the form of the perceived probability of loss (PRL). Perceived
probability of loss is further reduced, as according to Hypothesis 3, by govern-
ance in the form of restriction of room of opportunism (ROA) by means of legal
and private ordering. As hypothesized (Hypothesis 6b) it is also less when there
is perceived continuity in the relation (CON), on the basis of past growth and
future perspective.
These results can be seen as a confirmation of our thesis that both trust
and traditional factors from TCE are relevant, and that an extended
theory of transactions applies.
Contrary to Hypotheses 5 and 7, restraints on the incentive towards opportunism
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of alter, due to the value of ego (VE) and other factors that indicate the depen-
dence of alter (RSA), do not affect the perceived probability of loss. This need
not, of course, imply that they should not. Perhaps the suppliers considered in
the study are not sufficiently sophisticated to include this indirect evaluation of
the dependence of the partner as a condition that reduces their own risk. And
this might yield a policy implication: in assessing relational risk, one should not
only consider direct effects concerning one’s own dependence, but also indirect
effects through the partners’ dependence as a restraint on their opportunism.
Also, we find that uncertainty avoidance ego (UAE) has a negative effect
on perceived probability of loss, instead of the positive effect hypothesized
(Hypothesis 8). But this contrary effect has a clear interpretation: rather than
taking a relatively gloomy look at the perceived risk that remains after measures
of governance are taken, as we hypothesized, risk averse firms see to it, more
than others, that risk is sufficiently covered. This makes good sense.
Risk in the form of the size of loss, if the relation goes wrong, as
hypothesized, is positively affected by the value of the partner in terms of
percentage of one’s turnover that is associated with that partner, but remaining
aspects of partner value (RVA) have no significant effect. Thus Hypothesis 1 is
partly confirmed. Switching costs due to dedicated and transaction specific
investments (ASE) also has the hypothesized positive effect on size of loss
(Hypothesis 2), but only after we disallow for an effect of RSA, which is
strongly correlated with ASE. Continuity of the relation (CON) has its hypothe-
sized positive effect on size of loss (Hypothesis 6a). Firm size does not have the
hypothesized negative effect (Hypothesis 9). We do not consider this as a final
verdict. As is often the case, firm size is correlated with many other variables, so
that its effect may be masked.
The check on firm specific effects, on the basis of dummies, shows that
firm specific effects are important, and that firm variables such as uncertainty
avoidance and size do not suffice to cover all firm effects. However, the
omission of firm dummies does not, in the present study, yield a bias in the
measurement of the systematic effects derived from our extended theory of
transactions.
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Suggestions for further studies are the following:
- replicate the study on other sets of relations
- incorporate further firm specific variables to better explain firm effects
- expand the measurement of size and probability of risk by adding more
items as a basis for their composition
- conduct more refined studies, with some control of multicollinearity, to
test and estimate the components of explanatory variables (trust, asset
specificity, continuity, ...)
A policy recommendation is to see whether in their relations firms may be
advised to employ more sophistication in their assessment of relational risk, in
particular by taking into account the restraint that a partner may need and want
to exercise in view of his dependence; in particular dependence in view of
different dimensions of value that one is offering to the partner.
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Appendix A: measurement and scales used
Dependent variables
SLE: Size of loss ego (α=0.90)
- Actually, we cannot afford a break with this customer
- If the relation with this customer breaks, it will take us much effort to fill the
gap in turnover
PLE: Probability of loss ego
- The risk in this relation is sufficiently covered by contractual and non-contrac-
tual means
Explanatory variables: captiveness
VA: Value alter (α=0.70)
- Because we supply to this customer we are able to build up technological know-
how that is useful also for other customers
- Because we supply to this customer we obtain market knowledge that would
otherwise be difficult to access
- Our firm is involved in an early stage in the development of new components
for this customer ("early supplier involvement")
- This customer involves us in the testing of components and/or in prototyping
DA: Dedicated assets (α=0.83)
- Our firm employs significantly more people than when we would not supply to
this customer
- Our firm must have people with specific expertise in house to be able to supply
to this customer
- Our firm has had to create extra capacity to supply to this customer
- We had to make investments to satisfy the specific supply conditions of this
customer (e.g. for "just-in-time")
PAS: Physical asset specificity (α=0.70)
- For our production for this customer highly specific machines, apparatus or
instruments are needed
- Most of the machines, apparatus or instruments needed for the production for
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this customer can also be used for other customers, if necessary
KAS: Knowledge specificity (α=0.68)
- We have had to invest much time in acquiring the procedures desired for this
customer (e.g. in the area of logistics and quality control)
- Much specific technological know-how is required to effectively supply to this
customer
- Much knowledge of the internal organization of this customer is required for
effective cooperation
LS: Location specificity
- The location of our firm plays an important role in the relation with this
customer
SWE: switching costs ego = ASE asset specificity ego (α=0.84) = dedicated assets +
physical asset specificity + knowledge specificity + location specificity
Explanatory variables: governance
LS: Legal safeguards (α=.79)
- The contract with this customer is as complete as possible
- The contract forms the core of our relation with this customer
- It is not so important in this relation to have a good contract
PO: Private ordering (α=.71)
- The customer shares in the payment for specific machines and apparatus that we
must make for the production for him
- The customer shares in the payment for the investments in specific tools and/or
measurement apparatus that we must make for the production for him
- Guarantees are given for minimal custom over an agreed period of time
- We give guarantees for supply for an agreed period of time
ROA: Restriction of room for opportunism alter (α=...) = legal safeguards + private
ordering
Explanatory variables: incentive related
VE: Value ego (α=0.76)
- Our supply performance to this customer cannot be assessed on its merit if one
looks only at the price
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- This customer is aware that our supply performance cannot be assessed on its
merit if one looks only at price
- Our supply to this customer is clearly custom made
- We provide an important source of information on new technologies for this
customer
- Our firm is involved in an early stage in the development of new components
for this customer ("early supplier involvement")
- This customer involves us in the testing of components and/or in prototyping
GR: Growth (α=0.68)
- The relation between our firm and this customer has continually improved in the
course of time
- Our supply to this customer has increased strongly in the course of time
FP: Future perspective (α=0.67)
- In this relation it is assumed that contracts will in general be renewed
- For the foreseeable future we do not expect a break with this customer
- We see the relation with this customer as a long term relation, in which one
must invest, and in which both sides are willing to make concessions if it is
really needed
CON: Continuity (α=0.78) = growth + future perspective
RSA: Restraint alter (α=0.80)
- If this customer did not behave fairly with respect to us, he could seriously
damage his reputation in the market
- This customer is more dependent on us then we on him
- This customer cannot afford a break with us
- If the relation with our firm breaks, the customer will have trouble finding a
comparable supplier
- We know much more about the customer than he about us
Explanatory variables: trust related
HAB: Habitualization (α=0.75)
- Because we have been doing business so long with this customer, all kinds of
procedures have become self-evident
- Because we have been doing business for so long with this customer, we can
understand each other well and quickly
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INST: Institutionalization (α=0.87)
- In this relation, both sides are expected not to make demands that can seriously
damage the interests of the other
- In this relation the strongest side is expected not to pursue its interest at all
costs
HI: Habitualization/institutionalization (α=0.77) = Habitualization + institutionalization +
item:
- In this relation informal agreements have the same significance as formal
contracts
- In our contacts with this customer we have never had the feeling of being
misled
Control variables
UAE: Uncertainty avoidance ego (α=0.80):
- In our relations with customers, our firm always tries to cover everything
watertight contractually
- In the contact with customers we stick to the procedures and rules that apply in
our firm
- We want to prevent becoming too dependent on one or a few large customers
- In our firm there is a clear preference for risky projects with an opportunity for
high profits
- In view of the nature of our industry it is best to proceed cautiously, and not
take too large steps
- With us, decisions are taken fast
- With us, administrative procedures play an important role
S: Size = annual turnover supplier
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Appendix B: correlation matrix
Correlations: PDE VAR61 HI ROA FO ASE
PDE 1.0000 -.3238* .1367 .3044* .4042** .4485**
VAR61 -.3238* 1.0000 -.3002* -.4138** -.4658** -.0487
HI .1367 -.3002* 1.0000 -.0034 .4837** .0242
ROA .3044* -.4138** -.0034 1.0000 .3300** .1734
FO .4042** -.4658** .4837** .3300** 1.0000 .1694
ASE .4485** -.0487 .0242 .1734 .1694 1.0000
VA .3314** -.3332** .1221 .3676** .3670** .5600**
PEROMZET .6372** -.0627 .0073 .2153 .1314 .4284**
ASA .3254* -.0769 .1242 .3117* .2279 .3721**
VE .2785* -.3243* .2493 .3248* .3853** .4326**
UAE .0193 -.1398 -.1823 -.0578 -.0086 .2073
SIZE .1065 -.2056 -.0363 .5233** .3913** .0204
RSA .2701* -.1296 .2461 -.0011 .2409 .5356**
Correlations: VA PEROMZET ASA VE UAE SIZE
PDE .3314** .6372** .3254* .2785* .0193 .1065
VAR61 -.3332** -.0627 -.0769 -.3243* -.1398 -.2056
HI .1221 .0073 .1242 .2493 -.1823 -.0363
ROA .3676** .2153 .3117* .3248* -.0578 .5233**
FO .3670** .1314 .2279 .3853** -.0086 .3913**
ASE .5600** .4284** .3721** .4326** .2073 .0204
VA 1.0000 .1490 .3446** .8455** .2521 .2425
PEROMZET .1490 1.0000 .1902 .1456 -.1173 -.0416
ASA .3446** .1902 1.0000 .3909** .1445 .3283*
VE .8455** .1456 .3909** 1.0000 .1051 .1837
UAE .2521 -.1173 .1445 .1051 1.0000 -.0555
SIZE .2425 -.0416 .3283* .1837 -.0555 1.0000















N of cases: 97 2-tailed Signif: * - .01 ** - .001
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